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GERMANY TODAY ♦ ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM

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### INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

P. O. Box 44, Sta. O, New York, N. Y.

## On The Question of War

**A**NOTHER world war may be delayed for some time, notwithstanding the scares and ultimata constantly issuing from Berlin and Rome. The lines for the 1914-1918 conflict began to be drawn in the 70's. However, things move much faster nowadays. The world war that is coming this time has been gathering since 1918. It is said that, though Britain and France have appreciably strengthened their "defences" since the Munich affair, Germany may be obliged by the peculiar distress of its national capitalism to gamble against odds and attempt to find relief in a sudden, unannounced war.

What should be the attitude of the socialist in face of such a war?

The International Review has described the situation in the following words:

There are two sets of capitalist powers facing each other in the world arena. There are, on one hand, powers like France, England, Russia, having at the disposal of their national economies: capital for investment, extensive sources of raw material for their manufacturing needs, active and potential outlets for the profitable disposal of their products. (In this category belongs, of course, the confident young giant of capitalism, the United States.) Facing these "satisfied," or Have, States, are the lean wolves, representing national economies that do not possess the mentioned assets in great quantities. Hitler has explained the situation, for Germany, in his Kroll Opera House speech. "Germany, the greater converter of raw materials into finished

products, without sources of raw material, without markets, without capital. Share these things with us. Share the shrinking world market with us. Share peacefully, or we shall make you share it by force." A similar plaint and challenge come from Rome and Tokio.

The so-called dissatisfied powers have joined hands, under the subterfuge of an "Anti-Comintern" Pact. Acting more or less in combination, they grasp at all opportunities to better their economic and military position on the world scene. Their diplomacy in regards to the satisfied powers has been correctly described as a policy of blackmail. Knowing that their opponents have little to gain and much to lose in a general conflict, the so-called aggressive, dissatisfied powers, are dangling the possibility of war before the noses of the Haves.

For the same reason that the lean wolves are aggressive, they are "totalitarian." Their national economies have been hard hit in the hurly-burly of world capitalism, meeting with extreme difficulties largely because of their lack of the mentioned things. As a result, the traditional political superstructure has been replaced in these countries, in expression of popular discontent, by the "totalitarian" forms of government.

In the last world war, the issue of "making the world safe for democracy" was obviously an invention of the slogan writer. It is plain that in the threatening war the line-up is really that of democratic versus non-democratic powers.

Now there is no doubt in our minds that political democracy is something to defend. The labor movement was born in the battle for democracy. Socialism will win in the complete conquest of democracy. Democracy is something worth fighting for.

The question is: Though the line-up this time is satisfied democratic powers vs. dissatisfied anti-democratic powers, shall we be fighting for democracy in the coming war?

The International Review invites its readers to answer this question in simple, direct statements addressed to the magazine. We shall also try to answer the question ourselves. We shall publish in the next issue of the International Review your and our answers—let us hope not after the bloody game has already begun.

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# Debate In Spain

• Roberto

**PEOPLE** ask: "Why the fall of Barcelona without a fight? Why the probable surrender of the Valencia-Madrid zone?"

The answer invariably given is: "There was no adequate war material. There was hunger and disorganization."

It is obvious that the first two conditions, and as a consequence, the third, were decided by the attitude of the great powers.

We have pointed out that the latter-day tools of war do not lend themselves to ready use by an enthusiastic but untrained citizen army. The days of 1793 are gone. In this conflict, the nucleus of the rebel side was the entire office corps of the Spanish army. That army, while poor numerically in soldiers, offered a brilliant array of generals and officers, who were lodged in the garrisons of the peninsula when they were not playing war in Morocco. This nucleus received, since July 19, 1936, constant accessions in the form of financial and most modern technical aid as well as man-power. The Moroccan army of 17,000 became an army close to a million by the end of the civil war.

The immediate agents of the victorious rebellion were the commanding ranks of the national army. They acted for, and were supported by, the following social elements and interests: the native big property owners (industrialists, merchants and landowners), the foreign big property owners (British, French and Belgian concerns), the Church (which is, by proxy and outright, one of the biggest land, industrial and financial capitalists in Spain), the conservative middle-class city and rural population, the Carlist small farmers of Navarre and adjoining regions, the nationalist intelligentsia expressing itself politically in the *Falange española*.

The social elements of the population backing actively the Republican side in the civil war were: the industrial workers of the cities, the liberal and radical intellectuals, some of the city petty-bourgeois,

(1) If the liberals and radicals of the world could break through the screen of partisan publicity that was put between them and the Spanish scene, they would understand that they who bled and hungered at the front were predominantly the silenced city workers and the unwilling, conscripted peasantry, and not the trimly uniformed, well-fed, well-armed "crack" units under Lister and Modesto, which had been given such splendid write-ups in the world press. They would then understand that the mentioned "crack" units practically filled the comfortable function of military police, imposing the will of their political masters on the "reorganized" Catalan army. The ranks started to ask what they were fighting for. What was the difference between the terror promised by Franco and that already exercised by the "Cheka" (now a good Spanish word). However, the distrustful and therefore badly armed Catalan trade-unionists fought to the last. We thus have the grand gesture of the self-sacrifice of the 450 at Puigcerda. At the same time the beautifully uniformed "crack" unit under Lister was crossing the French line with the "treasure" trucks. For some correspondents, at least, it did not matter who actually died fighting. They finished up their jobs on the Catalan war front with the customary fairy tale about heroic rear-guard action by the Modesto and Lister "crack" units.

some of the peasantry, which, however, remained largely neutral. In the field of battle, the republican government supported itself at first on groups of volunteers organized by the city workers' political and trade-union organizations. Later it was represented in the field by a "disciplined" conscripted army under the pre-emptive and jealous control of the Communist national and international structures.

It was the enthusiasm bred by the utopian socialist aspirations of the first fighters that squelched the rebellion in Madrid and Barcelona and other large cities in July 1936, checking what appeared to be an immediate rebel victory. But though besieged city garrisons could be smothered by quickly and boldly acting masses of workers, mere numbers and enthusiasm could not take fortresses or cope with the arms and organization wielded by a professional enemy in a far-flung military campaign. Moreover, as the ranks of the first volunteer fighters were thinned out in combat, or "liquidated" or dispersed by the increasingly jealous action of the Communist police power, the early enthusiasm and faith in victory died. Simultaneously came the liquidation, at the behest of the Communist power, of the "socialist" construction which the industrial workers of Catalonia and Aragon had permitted themselves when they found arms in their hands.

The Anti-Fascist Militia Committees were suppressed, you remember, in the name of political and military unity, for the sake of a single command. What kind of political and military unity followed?

The government continued to be torn between three factions: the Russian partisans; the Catalan republicans, who placed their hope in French intervention; and those who sought British mediation in behalf of an armistice that was to be followed by a compromise with the rebels.

Lukewarm Spanish professionals and international bluntness with supposed World War experience played at high command. The first always had their mind on winning forgiveness from their old comrade—Franco. The latter were first interested in the immediate supremacy of their Party. It was not easy to be an enthusiastic soldier when you suspected that you attacked here and retreated there at the orders of traitors and partisan fourflushers. But there was no panic in the ranks. Unsung by the flim-flams of the Western world, the Republican ranks were carrying on in spite of everything.

Till the last moment the Loyalist government played up to the public and army the hope of intervention by the "democratic" powers, either as a result of the beginning of a general European war or out of sheer

(2) It is the "crack" unit under Enrique Lister which accomplished the "organization" of the Aragon front by suppressing with fire and bayonet the free agricultural cooperatives of that region.

solidarity with a fellow democracy. "We are fighting your war! The world war has begun in Spain!" ran the constant reproach. The population was angry with the "democratic" countries, which failed to understand. With hunger came general disbelief and confusion.

The pretext for their action first given by the rebels was that they rose against the social, economic and anti-religious excesses which swept the country after the dubious victory of the Leftists in the elections of February 1936. Under the tutelage of the Communists, the Loyalist government attempted to counter this charge by suppressing the workers' experiments at "socialist construction" in Catalonia and Aragon and by dissolving the armed units of the "irresponsible" elements that promoted those experiments. However, as the war progressed, the rebels, who had started as champions of the "counter-revolution" also began to present themselves as "revolutionists." In July 1936, the military leaders of the insurrection spoke of their government as the "Junta of National Defense." By 1937, there was much ado on the rebel side about a "new State," a "social program" and "national revolutionary reconstruction."

It is interesting to note that the rebel side also has had to curb its "extremists." "We carry on our war for the sake of the revolution, but we must not forget that in order to obtain the great victory of peace, it is first necessary to win the war." This warning, which reads like one appearing the Communist *Mundo Obrero*, was

(3) On August 4, 1937, the united "Traditional Spanish Falange and the J.O.N.S. (Juntas of National-syndicalist Offensive)" was recognized by Franco as the single State party and the instrument of a national program of social reform, embodied in the Falangist "Charter of Labor." According to this typically fascist Charter of Labor, Spain is to become a "gigantic syndicate of producers," with the national economy organized into vertical syndicates (trade-unions or corporations) according to the existing branches of production. This "national-syndicalist organization of the State will be inspired by the principles of Unity, Totality and Hierarchy..." (Chapter XIII of the Charter. "Not a home without a light, not a Spaniard without bread," proclaimed Franco, in reference to the promised program of social aid for the country.

The governmental structure proposed for the new national setup is: a National Council of the F.T.E. and J.O.N.S., a copy of the Italian Fascist Great Council, meeting once a year (on the 17th of July); a "Junta Política," the permanent committee of the National Council, six members of which are named by the Caudillo (Leader) and six by the National Council. At the peak of this top structure is the mentioned Caudillo, Franco himself, who, according to his own decree of August 4, 1937, is the national leader of the single totalitarian party and the new State and "personifies all values and all honors. As the author of the historic era in which Spain finds the possibilities of realizing its destiny, the Leader assumes the most absolute authority. He is responsible only before God and History." (Chapter X of the decree.) He has the right to name his own successor. There is of course some spread between this grand plan (a bombastic imitation of the Italian fascist State structure that is only more absolutist than its model) and the likelihood of its application in post-war Spain. The elimination of the Italians in favor of the British influence may knock the bottom out of the proposed national-syndicalist State and bring a governmental scheme that is more like that of the present "republic" of Portugal.



pearing in the Communist *Mundo Obrero*, was repeated constantly in the Phalangist dailies.

In view of the collaboration of the Italian and German governments in the rebellion, the Loyalist government called on all good Spaniards to resist patriotically the invasion of "international fascism." It called on them to remember the action taken by the Spanish patriots against Napoleon in 1808. Similarly the rebel propagandists roused the country to rise against the invasion of "international Marxism."

It is probable that a "national" uprising against Franco and his foreign allies would have actually transpired in the rebel territory if Great Britain and France had expressed their approval of such a movement—approval in the form of material aid. That is how such fine movements arise. However, the desires and fancies of many good people in the "democratic" countries notwithstanding, the attitude of the victors of Versailles toward the civil war in Spain was not going to be decided by an ideal like the preservation of a democratic government against fascist rebels and invaders. It was going to be decided by the real needs of those powers.

How much of the war material and food stuffs which the Republican government bought abroad was permitted to enter the Loyalist territory was determined since the beginning of the conflict by the high or low in the diplomatic seesaw played between the democratic powers and the Rome-Berlin axis. Wheat was bought in France, planes and Tsarist rifles of the 1901 vintage in Soviet Russia, anti-aircraft guns in Sweden, artillery and machine guns in Czechoslovakia. In 1937 there came the gift of some arms discarded by the Mexican army when it was reequipped with the "seconds" of the American army. Whether these supplies arrived in Loyalist Spain depended entirely on the diplomatic mood taken by the British-French alliance toward Hitler and Mussolini. Similarly the Russian intervention in the fortunes of the Loyalist government was first permitted by Great Britain in its alarm over the rush of the Italians and Germans into Spain. The difficulties of transport, and the need of keeping all material home in readiness for the eventuality of war, cut down almost entirely the shipments made by the Soviets in exchange for Spanish gold and Spanish oranges.

We have pointed out several times that Spain was not the central point over which the powers were playing their game of diplomatic deceit. Spain was important to the extent that it affected the game of advantages (blackmail) being played over larger stakes on the green tables of Europe. For the victors of Versailles, the Spanish Civil War was an unpleasant affair which it was important to limit to Spain. For they had nothing to gain in a general European conflict. Similarly for the totalitarian, have-not powers, Spain was important only in so far as it gave them a chance to try to win handouts from France and Britain.

Good liberals and radicals in the latter countries exclaimed in righteous exasperation: "That the war in Spain was from

the outset a war against France and Britain has always been obvious to people not blinded by class prejudices." (New Statesman and Nation, London, January, 1939.)

However, it was not the victory of Franco that offered danger to England and France but the victory of a Franco who remained under the domination of the two desperate, bankrupt "totalitarian" States, which had entered the mixup in Spain primarily to force concessions from the two victors of Versailles.

Just as unwelcome to France and England as the last condition was the possibility of a Loyalist victory under Russian hegemony, or the continuation of the "social disorder" that reigned in Spain before July 19, 1936.

Indeed, the rebellion first began under the auspices of certain British and French interests with investments in Spain, who wanted to help with the correction of that awful situation, which was endangering the profitability of their Spanish enterprises. The rebellion was stolen, so to speak, by the Fascist-Nazi alliance, since the "democratic" investors were unable to act openly through their own States.

True, the publicity staffs of the busted totalitarian governments in Rome and Berlin emphasized their arguments for blackmail with threats like the following:

"Since the Rome-Berlin axis, there is a new front on the Italian Alps, where there is no Maginot line. And suddenly to the West, on the Pyrenean front, has arisen a national State allied to the Italian-German axis, the richest State in Europe as regards the raw materials needed for modern war. . . . Barcelona is the nerve center where the Mediterranean influence of France can be paralyzed, if the Italians install themselves in Catalonia as they already have installed themselves in the Balearics." (National Zeitung, June 13, 1938.)

We wrote a year ago (vol. 2, No. 9, International Review): "Traditionally, the British State holds a protectorate over the Iberian peninsula. One expects even Franco, with his heavy commitments to Italy, to realize that it is easier to run his dictatorship with the good will of the British than in troublesome fief from Mussolini, whose hold on Spain would be a challenge to England and France. . . . If Franco did not understand what was best for everybody concerned, the scale might, at least be balanced by permitting the Frenchmen to throw effective aid to the now reformed and purged Loyalists. Paradoxically, there can be no complete Loyalist collapse unless Franco shifts his foreign allegiance from Mussolini. . . . Great Britain is willing to have the Spaniards fight on for another year or so, as long as the internal quarrel remains segregated and Russia and Italy stay out of Spain."

And later, by Xandu (vol. 3, No. 2, International Review): "British financial aid gave to the revolting generals what appears at this moment to be the beginning of a final victory. The new dictatorship will continue to depend on Great Britain. Only British money can liquidate Franco's Nazi and Italian commitments."

Well, it is now public knowledge that

five great London banks have been financing Franco's activities for at least a year's time.

It is hard to believe that the Nazi and Fascist braves would let go of such a prize: "the richest State in Europe as regards raw materials needed for war." But it is less easy to imagine what the two impoverished totalitarian powers could do to keep Franco's Spain from going to the City of London for financial assistance in rebuilding the devastated country or just meeting the expenses of government. The braves, too, would like to get that kind of help from the London banks. Of course, if such an amicable settlement is not reached between the British-French alliance and the totalitarian axis, there is the possibility of an internal conflict in the Franco camp over the issue: Britain vs. our Noble Allies.<sup>4</sup> What chance will the claims of the Nazis and the Italian Fascists have against the needs of "law and order" and "national reconstruction" that can be made possible by British and French financial aid to the war-shattered country?

Phalangism is a powerful force in Franco Spain. By replacing the social-democratic, anarcho-syndicalist and Catholic trade unions, its mass organizations have taken in a huge membership that is not quite the dumb following that the Fascist intellectuals at the top presume to manipulate. It is doubtful if in the face of British-French opposition, the Falange can be the willing tool of Italian fascism. Again, everything depends on the international situation.

However, the importance of Phalangism in Franco's Spain is a sign that a "national revolution similar to that which had been planned by the Loyalist government—that is, agrarian reform and modified State capitalism—will at least be attempted by the Franco regime. That would suggest to the victorious fascists and traditionalists the need of the good-will of the entire population of the country, including the city workers. So far, Franco's proclamations have echoed Primo de Rivera and Sanjurjo. Considering the record of these crusaders to save "Christianity and civilization" in Spain, there is sure to be a lot of killing, at least of all known radicals. They say that they do not intend to repeat their "leniency" of 1934. That means the continuation of the guerilla warfare that marked the Spanish cities since 1917.

But there is still Madrid—possibly sans C. P.-Negrin.

(4) Though officially all political parties have been suppressed in favor of the reorganized Falange, there has, in the past, been as little real unity in the rebel camp as among the Republicans. Thus exactly one year after the traditionalists (monarchist Catholics) and the Falange (fascist) have apparently been joined by Franco's decree under the long name of "Traditional Spanish Phalanx and the Juntas of National Syndicalist Offensive (F.E.T. y J.O. N.S.), the *Diario de Burgos* (April 1938) reports General Yague commemorating the anniversary decree by such a statement: "They (the whites and reds) are beginning to understand each other. They perhaps are starting to suspect their next common enemy, and feel, on the front, on the bleeding Spanish soil, the need of uniting." And before, on August 11, 1937, General Queipo de Llano exclaims over the Sevilla Radio station: "What, will it no longer be possible for anybody who is not a Phalangist to live in Spain?"



# C.I.O.—Where Now?

• Sylvie

IN FACE of some rather amusing enthusiasm over the rise of the C.I.O., we have attempted to explain that this "most important social fact this country has known since the Civil War" (so said Benjamin Stolberg in his *Story of the C.I.O.*) was only a subordinate part of the "important social event" called the New Deal.

Workers strike (1) when the spread between their wages and the prices of food, clothing and shelter becomes too great to be endured and (2) when an increase in the demand for labor power permits them to strike. The first great strike movement in the United States since the beginning of the world crises came in 1933, after the depression had "struck bottom" and the contracted world market started to expand a little. It coincided with, and was to an extent inspired by, Roosevelt's first attempt to "awaken the home market" through the N.R.A. The strike movement created its own instruments: new unions, which could not be anything but "industrial" unions since they were meant to function in the mass production industries, where the old craft unions were meaningless. In their initial timidity, these self-organized new unions begged their way into recognition as dues-paying, temporary "federal unions" by the more or less reluctant officialdom of the American Federation of Labor. The A. F. of L. was a federated organization composed of many "craft unions," representing skilled workers, and of several large "industrial unions," active in certain mass production branches of industry. In the internal struggle for power and the biggest offices within the Federation, the big boys of the American labor business came to group themselves into two opposing camps: the craft-unionists vs. the industrial unionists.

The labor sections of the unsuccessful N.R.A. program, and the later Federal commissions sent to study the relations between government, employers and labor unions in Sweden and Great Britain, make clear the expectations of the Roosevelt administration in regards to Labor. Representing the social outlook of the more "progressive" sections of the American propertied strata, the Roosevelt administration understands that for the sake of industrial peace and economy (both of which count a great deal under the latter-day pinched conditions of capital accumulation) it is important to rationalize, under government regulation, the bargaining relation between workers and their employers and thus avoid costly, open and disorderly labor-capital conflicts. Roosevelt's first attempt to institute a nation-wide bargaining system between employers and correctly officered worker organizations under the direct supervision of the government, failed largely because of the capitalist interests in the United States which had their investments in branches where the productivity of labor was relatively low, making the union recognition "uneconomic." On the other hand, the labor section of the N.R.A.

was supported by the highly "rationalized" branches of industry, which could afford unions. It was made use of (as far as the collection of dues from the federal unions was concerned), but not too warmly backed, by the top officials of the A. F. of L. That was because most of them were representatives of the "craft unions," and felt that their rivals, the officialdom topping organizations in the mass production industries, had more to gain from such "industrial-union" additions to organized labor.

In 1936 there came a kind of prosperity, and therefore the rise of another strike movement. By then the nabobs bossing the "mass production" unions within the A. F. of L. realized—with the consultation of members of the Roosevelt administration—that they could take advantage of the new great movement of workers for union organization only by acting outside of the Federation, which was dominated by their "craft union" opponents. The idea was to meet this spontaneous wave of organization on the part of the unorganized workers, take it in hand, build the new unions under the direct control of the "progressive" caucus of big industrial-union officials like Lewis, Hillman, Dubinsky, Gorman and others. The immediate program of the C.I.O. was the centralized organization of the workers in each unionized industry under the top centralization of a national office. There already existed a personal tie-up between the progressive section of the Democratic Party, close to the Roosevelt administration, and the new national labor-union enterprise. The institution of the National Labor Relations Board was the first step toward the more inclusive and more stable arrangement that the Roosevelt government planned for the future: government adjustment of labor relations, made possible by the general unionization of workers in inclusive responsible organizations managed by a dependable and honest union officialdom.

The caucus of industrial-union bosses (acting under the name of Committee for Industrial Organization) applied itself, in a very business-like manner, to the task of taking in hand the rising strike wave. Special levies on the membership of the unions they headed, as well as loans from well-disposed moneyed "progressives," supplied the finances. However, the actual unionization, the taking over of the unions in the name of the C.I.O., called for a big number of field men.

The depression had set loose, economically and socially, many intellectuals, turning them to the radical political groupings, especially the Communist Party. These were the people who were on hand to be hired to do the field work of harnessing the great national movement for unionization in behalf of the C.I.O. Lewis and Hillman and their entourage realized that by using these "organizers" they were to a considerable extent entering into a partnership with political forces whom they had always

fought, and suppressed, within their unions. (The constitution of Lewis' own union bars members of the C. P. from the smallest offices and practically from union membership.) Obviously their plan was to use the various radical political as long as the latter were serviceable and then ditch them. Neither did the "radical" politicians enter the partnership with their eyes closed. The C.I.O. unionization drive offered them union officials' jobs for their adherents, and a chance for each "party" or "league" to get some mass basis, and rustle up some financial sustenance by fastening itself as a "leadership" on this or that union.

It is understood that of the rival radical saviors of labor doing field and office work for the C.I.O., and with an eye on its own welfare, the Communist Party was most successful.<sup>1</sup>

The Communists had dropped their affiliation with the R.I.L.U., had adopted Lewis (the murderer, profligate and misleader of Labor that Foster and Ann Rochester had described him to be in a more "revolutionary" period) as one of their great "popular saints," and set themselves to gamble gently with the original Committee for the control of the unionization movement. The first job of the C. P., however, was cleaning out the rival radical saviors of labor. That, too, was not quite disapproved by the Committee. The first regard of the Lewis-Hillman set was to suppress any trend to decentralization, local domination, as well as tendencies to the desire of self-rule on the part of the workers. By cleaning out the rival saviors of labor and suppressing attempts of the membership of the local unions to run their organizations through independent representatives, the Communists helped to establish the local "unity" and national centralization that the Committee wanted first of all. That explains the support by the Committee of Bridges on the Coast and its opposition to Martin in the auto union.

The recent developments in the latter case suggest what Lewis and Hillman hope to do when the Communists have outlived their usefulness to them or have become too great a threat. Here the immediate task was getting rid of Martin, who, under the tutorship of the Lovestonites, was having dreams of ruling the auto union instead of taking orders from the national office of the C.I.O. The Communists did a fine job on Martin. As rumor mongers, they and their "liberal" stooges (see *Nation*, Feb. 11, 1939) cannot be equalled. In their bitter attack on Martin, they have, how-

(1) It had money. It had specialists instructed and trained in methods of "capturing" mass movements. It had a national plan of activity, suiting its role as the representative of a great world power. The matter of "building" unions was rather easy at the height of the C.I.O. unionization drive. All you had to do was to get an official order from the central C.I.O. in Washington, set up an office, naming yourselves as the officials of the new union, and then announce that the C.I.O. union was ready to receive members. The workers enrolled, made their "down" payment, and were then led out to buck their heads against the company fences. In some cases, the Communist thus "captured" definitely anti-Communist groups of workers, without having the latter ever find out that they were in a C. P. controlled organization.



ever, compromised themselves with a part of the membership of the union. That, too, Lewis and Hillman do not mind. A consequent move of the Committee in the auto union imbroglio was to appoint the "neutral" Thomas as the new president of the "international" and the openly anti-Communist Levinson as the editor of the official publication of the union: the *Auto Worker*. The Communists seized the office fixtures of the union headquarters, including the valuable mailing list. But they will be obliged to listen to reason.

And there you are. In spite of the apparent mutual animosity between Lewis and Green, there is talk of peace and reunion between the A. F. of L. and the present Congress of Industrial Organizations. Efforts have been made—by members of the Roosevelt administration—to bring them together. It is true that Green and his pals have come to realize that it is crazy to try to apportion the jurisdiction of, say, workers

in the automobile industry among machinists, carpenters, etc. (To begin with, they had yielded to the pull of the smaller labor bosses only because they wanted to put a spoke in the wheel of Lewis and Hillman.) Peace and reunion is possible. When that comes, or even before then, the central office of the present C.I.O. will start shedding the Communists. All over the country there are organizations like the Transport Workers' Union, dominated by the C. P., largely without the knowledge of the membership. But the Communists do not let go so easily.

All of this has little to do with the need of workers to control their own economic organizations. Here is an issue that brings a scowl to the faces of all the labor fakery. "What would the workers do without us?" they say. "Didn't we unionize them, raise their wages and better their conditions?" We shall deal with that in the next issue.

## "Aryanism and Historic Fact

• Coudenhove-Calergi

*From "Nouveaux Cahiers," Paris*

IN answering the theoreticians of "Aryanism," one finds himself hampered by the fact that there are three definitions of the term "Aryan." In the course of the discussion, the three concepts repeatedly get in the way of one another.

Taken in the first sense "Aryan" refers to people who use the languages included in the Indo-European linguistic group. This definition puts among the Aryans most Europeans, besides the Gypsies, Hindoos, Persians and Armenians. It puts the Finns, Estonians, Turks, Magyars, Bulgarians, Basques, Laplanders in the category of non-Aryans.

There is a second definition, basing itself on the consideration of the anthropological type. According to this use of the word, the Aryan is blond, blue-eyed and tall. He is found in a pure condition in the countries coasting the North and Baltic Seas, but also among the Kabyles of North Africa and the Asiatic Turks and Kurds. In any case, the type constitutes a minority in Europe. According to this meaning of the term, most Europeans are non-Aryans. Thus some Celts, Germans and Slavs are Aryans, and the Finns may be considered Aryans, though their language does not fall into the Aryan linguistic group.

The term is also used to mean simply "German." According to this definition, the Celts, Slavs and Finns, although tall and blond, constitute, as compared to the Germanic pure-bloods, an inferior race. The inference drawn from this proposition is the belief in the need of confiding to the chosen race the task of ruling the world. The Anglo-Saxon branch of the chosen race is to take charge of the parts of the globe outside of Europe, while the German branch is to look after the European portion of the world, peopled by the inferior

racess which stuff up the South, West, Center and East of the Continent.

The three definitions have this in common. According to all three, the Aryan race, whatever it may be, is the only creative race, the only genius race, the only race that has the capacity of having ideals, the only race, therefore, from which civilization and the possibilities of progress may be expected. Wherever the chosen race mixes with others, civilization deteriorates. The non-Aryan is, to say, midway between the Aryan and the Negro. There is no genius, no hero, who is not of Aryan blood. Without it neither intellectual heights nor moral grandeur may be attained. The first aim of all culture is the maintenance of the purity of Aryan blood, the careful breeding of that unique stock, which is destined to command the peoples of the planet.

The theory of Aryanism attempts to support itself on a series of historic facts. It is argued in the first place, that invasions of Aryan Nordics preceded the lowering of the Greek, Latin, Persian and Hindoo civilizations. In the course of the later great invasions, new contingents of Aryan Nordics penetrated into the more backward regions of Europe and thus created the bases of the modern State and Occidental civilization. And indeed, the Vikings were the founders of States. Europe owes to them the foundation of the Russian and English empires. In the course of the last few centuries, the peoples of Northern Europe were found at the head of Western civilization and technical progress, and we have seen the Anglo-Saxon especially take in the world a position that has never been equaled in history.

There are answers to all of this.

It is to be noted, in the first place, that what we call Western culture was definitely created in the Mediterranean coastal regions by non-Aryan peoples, and long

before the so-called Aryans had reached even Asia Minor. In so far as we can account ourselves, it seems that the first parents of our culture were not Aryans, and not even Semites, but the Sumerians, an ethnic group that was most likely Hurrian. What we call civilization was further developed by the Babylonians, Assyrians and Phoenicians, who were all Semites. We should add the elements contributed by non-Semites like the Egyptians and the Minoan Cretans. This development took place long before the first Aryan invasion of these regions. We have here a definitely pre-Aryan civilization the recent discovery of which has shattered all of our previous historic conceptions. This civilization extended to the Etruscans and Iberians. It included in its orbit the entire Mediterranean region at a time when there was nothing even to suggest the flowering of an "Aryan" culture. From the data on hand, we have a right to conclude that, instead of bringing civilization to the Mediterranean peoples, the so-called Aryans have on the contrary received their culture from them. To a civilization that was already thousands of years old they brought the leaven of their brutality. By mixing and interbreeding with the carriers of the old civilization, they made possible the blooming of the rejuvenated civilizations of Rome and Athens.

We find proof of this in the historic evolution following the period of the great invasions. We saw how the invading barbarians from the North were led and assimilated by the invaded peoples, the heirs of the Mediterranean culture. From the new mixture was born the modern European civilization. Without wanting to deny the merits of Northern Europe, we observe that the men of genius on the European continent were born for the most part not in the Northern regions but in those zones where interbreeding took place between the so-called Mediterranean and Nordic races: Northern Italy, Southern Germany, Holland and France. Southern Germany has furnished incomparably more men of genius than Northern Germany. The representative men of German genius, Goethe, Beethoven, are typically South German.

If the question of Nordic superiority had been posed four centuries ago, the peoples of Southern Europe would have found little trouble showing who were the Barbarians. Since then, the North has demonstrated such striking proofs of its genius, that it is objectively necessary to accord it a place of equality. On the other hand, all "Aryan" theories will not succeed in showing that Southern Europe is the home of an inferior race. But since it is important for the future of this theory that this supposed inferiority should acquire the rank of an established truth, its proponents very brazenly suggest that wherever a mixed civilization has produced something great, it was the Aryan element that dominated and that all the geniuses of mixed origin have had a large proportion of Aryan blood. On the last point nothing definite can be said one way or another, since no proof is possible.

Asia can shed some light on this obscure-



ness. When we can consider its many men of genius, heroes, saints, thinkers and artists, we find it hard to affirm that a so-called Aryan race has the monopoly on genius. The greatest conquerors of history were two Mongols: Djingis-Khan Temudschin and Timur Lenk (Tamerlane). After them come Alexander the Great and the Semite Omar Akbar, the Emperor of the Indias, descendant of Timur, was the most powerful emperor in the East and the West. The West has few philosophers to compare with the Chinese Lao-Tse and Confucius. On the political plane, Hideyoshi and Ito still seek their peers. To assert that all great civilizations or all great individualities can be explained by their Aryan blood is to ignore completely the history of Asia. In the light of historic knowledge, the theory of Aryanism is reduced to the rank of an awkward conceit of the half-educated, inflated by national pride.

However, it is not even necessary to go to the record of history to become aware of the absurdity underlying the "Aryan" theory. This is easily enough demonstrated by the simple fact that one's parents are doubled from generation to generation. Each human being has two parents, four grand-parents, eight great grand-parents. Thus in a thousand years, each individual has two ancestors raised to the thirty-third power, or 8,600,000,000. In fact, the number of ancestors owned by each one of us up to the Carolingian period, (8th and 9th centuries), is somewhat less imposing. That is because many of our ancestors are found at the same time in several branches. At any rate, thirty-three generations—a relatively brief period in human history—suffice to carry the number of every individual's ancestors into millions. The population of Europe was much smaller at that time than it is today. As a result, if it is doubled for each generation, the number of forefathers reaches a cipher representing the entire population of Europe in that period.

During the last thousand years our ancestors were largely Europeans. The Christian marriage laws made rather difficult unions with non-Europeans. However, excepting for the highest nobility and Jews, the differences of nationality offered no obstacle to marriage. And we can therefore state that if we only go back to the Carolingian epoch, each one of us has as his ancestors the totality of European nations and social classes. In a word, no matter what our language, we are all cousins.

The most that the European nobility can prove is that it goes back to Charlemagne. But the fact is that any European can say as much. How many families can boast of genealogical trees going back that far? The reigning dynasties of the continent have practiced inter-familial marriage for so long that they may be considered one family. Let us examine, for example, the genealogy of the Bourbon-Hapsburg-Wittelsbach family. We find among its ancestors the Persian dynasty of the Sas-

sanides, the prophet Mahomed, the Djingis-Khan Temudschin, Saint Elizabeth, the Jewish senator Peter Leonis, the popes Innocent VIII, Alexander VI, Paul III, the poet Geoffrey Chaucer, without counting a long series of bourgeois whose origin remains indeterminable. And we are not considering here the bastards. At any rate, in the veins of each one of us, whether noble or not, flows the blood of kings and slaves, saints and criminals, Jews, Mongols and Arabs. There can be no talk of a pure race.

This is well illustrated by the history of Europe, which is a sequence of migrations, expeditions, conquest, assimilation. Europe is a funnel into which Asia has poured for tens of thousands of years. Europe is a bridge between Africa and Asia. The movement of exchange has passed over it in both directions. Only during the historic period Spain was twice conquered by Africa: by Carthage and the Moors.

Since its earliest history, Europe has been the battlefield of strange peoples, from the Iberians to the Scythians. The continent was always in movement. Wars followed wars. Populations mixed without stop. The history of Greece begins with the invasion of the Peninsula by the Hellenes, who mix with the native Pelasgians. Then the Dorians, Ionians and Eolians overflow the same region. Rome first appears in history as the asylum of all kinds of fugitives. Children are born there of stolen Sabine women. Then come the Etruscans, then the Gauls. Italy is a melting pot into which Greeks, Etruscans, Carthaginians, Ligurians, Celts and Germans pour and mix. Out of this chaos the "Roman nation" is born. At the same time, the entire Near East is beaten up into a vast Hellenistic empire, which Alexander dreamt of creating by the force of arms. The rise of the Roman Empire hurries up this evolution. From all points of the realm flow slaves and soldiers. Everywhere there is the abduction and rape of women. Women are exported. The permanent bond of commercial exchange helps to make of the inhabitants of the Mediterranean coastal regions one great people of mixed blood. At that time the Mediterranean melts peoples in the same way as they were later mixed in the great ethnic melting pot of the United States.

Into it then pours the torrent of the Great Invasions. At first the Germans come to settle peaceably in the Roman provinces. Then the invasion becomes warlike. Other Germans cross the frontiers of the Danube and the Rhine with arms in their hands. And with them come the Mongoloid nomads: Huns, Avars, the invincible Alans, who drive on as far as Portugal, and even Slavs and Lithuanians. The trace of the Mongols is found in Southern Germany and in the Vendée. Little by little the new mixture unites organically the conquerors and the conquered, including the various nomad people.

Then come invasions by sea. Seeking the South, the Normans pillage, rob, rape,

establish States wherever they pass: in Normandy, England, Sicily, Russia.

Out of these two great invasions emerges the European race. The Christian unity offered by the Church helps to complete the leveling. The Christian world begins to consider itself as one large family, in spite of differences of dialect. From the south comes a new blood infusion—the Saracens conquer Spain, Southern France, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. They pillage the Italian coasts and penetrate even into the Alpine valleys. The Mongols, from their side, ravage Poland and Hungary, reach Silesia, Moravia, Austria and even Dalmatia, while the Turks camp twice at the gates of Vienna.

In spite of these marginal invasions, the mixing continues in the heart of the continent. Each invasion leaves behind it not only dead but also bastards. The Crusades cut across entire Europe. Merchants' caravans act like leaven. The establishment of colonies extends this movement across the seas.

Germany east of the Elbe is conquered, colonized, Germanized. The colonization reaches the Baltic. Then come the great European Wars: the Hundred Years' War between France and England, the Hussite Wars, the Religious Wars, the Thirty Years' War. Europe is overrun with Spanish and Swedish bands. The Reformation ushers in a new period of mixing. Protestants are chased from Catholic countries, Catholics from Protestant countries. People wander over Europe in search of a homeland. Intelligent kings offer them land. The exiles settle in Bohemia, Hungary, Prussia and Poland.

The 19th century brings the railroad and navigation by steam. It is the century of travel. A pacific invasion commences. Millions of Europeans pass their national frontiers yearly, creating new points of contact between people and people. Marriages, legitimate and illegitimate, take place. Then comes the World War, and with it the latest of the great migrations. Millions of soldiers camp in foreign countries. Prisoners, by the hundreds of thousands, work in the fields of the enemy. Many, at the end of the war, remain in their new homelands. Then Bolshevism throws Russian émigrés into Western Europe by the millions. The Greco-Turkish War moves a million and a half Christians from Asia Minor to the Balkans. As a result of the new frontiers drawn by the post-war treaties entire provinces are depopulated.

From this ethnic chaos come the nations of today. A common language, the same climate, the same customs, a slight blood relationship—that is enough to isolate large groups of people into ideological communities. The real historic bond of these national groups is generally only the common language, but believing themselves to be composed of persons of the same blood, they have invented for themselves myths of their origin.

For example, the Romance-speaking peoples believe themselves to be the descendants and heirs of the ancient Romans. They

(1) C. F.: *Das Geheimnis des Blutes*. By Otto Forst de Battaglia, Vienna-Leipzig, Reinhold-Verlag, 1932.



may be that in spirit, but certainly not by actual biologic descent. They have kept the Latin language, grammar and even Roman logic. However, there is very little Italian "blood" in their veins. The Italians mixed with Goths, Longobards, Normans and others. The Iberians were Romanized, but after the passage of the Vandals, they were for centuries under the domination of the Goths and then the Moors. After being Romanized, the Gauls had as their masters the Franks, Bugundians, Goths and Normans. Miraculously surviving many invasions, a Latin dialect is still spoken in Rumania. But by ethnic descent the Rumanians are Slavs and Turanians rather than Latins.

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The idea of a homogeneous Germanic ethnic group is just as much of a myth.

Take England for example. It was Celtic at the time of the Roman invasion. Then came, in turn, the Anglo-Saxon, Danish and Norman invasions. If the Normans had imposed their Latin dialect on the population of the island, the English would have been considered today to be the descendants of the Romans. And similarly, if the Frank conquerors had imposed their Germanic tongue on the population of Gaul, the French would have been considered today as Germans.

In Germany the so-called Nordic type predominates only in the provinces of the Northwest: in Lower Saxony, in Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein. When we first hear of Germany, it is Celtic. Nobody knows what it was before the Celts came there. Then arrive the Germans. The children of these Celts, Germans and the aborigines of the region form today the German nation. However, east of the Elbe, the so-called Germans are mostly Slavs who have mixed with the others. For during the Carolingian epoch, the River Elbe was the eastern limit of Germany. Today the descendants of these Slavs, and of various Lithuanian peoples, speak German and consider themselves to be scions of the ancient Germans. They are, in fact, kinsmen of the Poles and Czechs rather than relatives of the Lower Saxons and South Germans. A similar story can be told about the Scandinavians. In the North, they have mixed with the Lapps; on the East, with the Finns. This way they not only break through the boundaries of the Germanic sphere but also those of the Indo-European world.

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The picture is no different when we consider the Slavs. The Great Russians are as much Finnish and Mongolian as Slavic. The Poles have mixed with Lithuanians and Ukrainians and a multitude of forgotten peoples now unified by the Polish language. The Czechs received much German blood and gave much Czech blood to Austria and German Bohemia. The Bulgarians are Turanians who late in their history came to speak a Slavic language. Though they are close relatives of the Magyars and Turks, they consider themselves to be Slavs. The Serbs, Croats and Slovenians are Slavicized Illyrians mixed

with Slavs, Goths and other immigrants who have entered the country at one time or another, without counting the Turks, and the Austrians, from the old frontier provinces.

Because they talk a language similar to Finnish, the Hungarians refer to themselves as Turanians. They have, however, lost almost entirely their Mongol blood and are really Slavs. Only to a microscopic extent are the Turks of today the descendants of Osman's Asiatic horsemen. In their veins runs the blood of all the peoples of Byzantium: the Hittites, Lydians, Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, Galatians. In the Ottoman Empire, whoever adhered to Islam was recognized as a Turk, while those persons who confessed to the Greek Catholic faith was called Greeks, without consideration of race. The Greeks of today are only in an infinitesimal degree the descendants of the ancient Hellenes. There are few parts of the world that have been invaded as many times during the last two thousand years as Greece.

The Jews, too, delude themselves when they express belief in their racial purity. At the beginning of their history, they represent a mixture of Semite elements, Hittites (who spoke an Indo-European language) and Amorites—the latter as blond as their neighbors the Philistines and, like them, Nordics. During the Hellenistic period, Judaism made converts among the Mediterranean peoples: the Romans, Greeks, Gauls and Egyptians.<sup>2</sup> One may correctly say that after the destruction of Jerusalem, the majority of Jews were non-Jews. Then in the 8th century, the king of the Chazars, ruling a district in the south of present Russia, adopted Judaism, together with his nobility and people, thus bringing to Jewry a flood of Turanian blood. Later Judaism renounced proselytizing and proclaimed the common descent of all

(2) See *Das Wesen des Antisemitismus* (The Nature of Antisemitism). By Count Heinrich Condeshove-Calergi, Vienna.

its followers from Abraham. History gave to all adherents of the Jewish faith the same destiny, the same customs. Their common religion and the persecutions they all suffered have made of them a distinct branch of the European race. But there is not a single "gentile" European without Jewish "blood" in his veins. Similarly there is not a European Jew without non-Jewish ancestry. The Jews, like other European racial strains, are a conglomerate of ethnic heritages.

The fact is that Europe forms a single race, a community of kin, subject to a thousand variations. One of its component ethnic elements is the blond, Nordic type; another is the dark Mediterranean type. Between these we find the so-called Alpine type. In Eastern Europe the Mongolian influence predominates. In the South we find the Negroid African influence. The white race stretches southward to the Sahara, southeast to India. The conquest of the Western Hemisphere brought it to the two American continents. In North America it has remained pure. In South America it has mixed with Indians and Negroes. In Northern Asia it has interbred with the Mongolian peoples to form a Eurasian race.

In the United States the descendants of all European nations have mixed for generations. We do not see any degeneration resulting. Joined by a common language, the same manner of living, and the belief in a common destiny, all these people consider themselves to be forming one powerful nation, the common mother of which is Europe. And so the peoples of Europe will one day perceive that they have been victims of a frightful fraud, that, in the hands of demagogues and half-educated politicians, their differences of language have become a pretext for all kinds of abuses and cruelty; that for centuries, they have been thrown against each other, without reason, to the hurt of their common future.

## Sects and Vanguards In Labor Movement

• J. Ayres

THE publication, in English translation, of Martov's essays on the State and the socialist revolution<sup>1</sup> has thrown into a dither the Right and Left "Communist Oppositions," which, after a series of changes of name and false whiskers, are doing business locally under the guises of an "independent labor league" and a "socialist workers' party." Martov is found to be especially dangerous fare for the followers of these two sets of self-styled saviors of the working class.

The expert writing for the first outfit of professional "leaders of the masses" shoos away the innocent with the naively cunning: "Don't try it. I, the apex of Marxian

learning, assure you that the Martov pamphlet is a great disappointment, and not the very best thing to read, you know. So don't waste your time. Do not trouble your mind with unnecessary doubts. Read again, instead, the beautiful, poetic, inspiring work of our great father Lenin on the same question. Lectures by our leader Lovestone, or others of our staff of qualified Marxist professors, on the subject of the universality and essential loveliness of Lenin—the great democrat, our kindly light, and the rock of ages—is much better fun and a lot more instructive."

The second expert warns, almost in Leon Trotsky's own dramatic, *La Traviata* style: "It is a plot. A plot to deny us the leadership of the masses. A plot to serve the dastardly reformists with an excuse for

(1) J. Martov: *State and Socialist Revolution*, International Review, 64 pp. 25c.



their betrayals and this way hold us back from emancipating the masses. It is a plot of the mischievous semi-anarchist, semi-syndicalist, semi-socialist International Review to supply theoretic arguments to social democrats, pseudo-scientific Marxists, disheartened intellectuals, cowardly passivists, and this way help them to stop us—the real, up-and-going, tactically and strategically active, revolutionary vanguardist, revolutionary Marxist, Bolshevik-Leninist, Leninist-Bolshevik, genuine sons of the great father Lenin by comrade Trotsky (ideologically speaking, of course)—from building the Fourth International. And that means no less than to reject the proletarian revolution and invite fascism?"

### Marx on "Vanguards"

This may be another occasion for quoting what Marx had to say on the "socialist" sects of his time. Just as the chancicleer in the play believes that its morning crowing pulls the sun over the horizon, so these sects—like the self-avowed, little "revolutionary vanguards" of today—tried to make themselves and others believe they were actually "leading" the working class forward. According to Marx, the development of these "revolutionary vanguards" and "that of the real workers' movement always stand in inverse ratio to each other. So long as the sects are (historically) justified, the working class is not yet ripe for an independent historic movement. As soon as it has attained this maturity, all sects are essentially reactionary."

Marx pointed out the usual great lag of prevalent ideology behind material change. The political maturity of the working class (or rather, that of the majority of the population in capitalist society)—its ripeness for independent historic action, undiverted by the lilliputian pull of the various sets of self-appointed vanguards—will come when the movement of capitalism will have demonstrated overwhelmingly that the socialist revolution is the only way out of the capitalist purgatory. It will come after much bitter experience, after repeated disillusionment, after many attempts to make capitalism act the way it cannot act. The increasingly rapid movement of latter-day capitalist development is a condition for the historic maturity of the working class. The basis of this maturity—the changed attitude of the individual toward society—is already becoming noticeable now. Very few workers today believe they can ever be anything but wage slaves when not on relief. Material conditions oblige more and more erstwhile members of the so-called middle strata to understand they are doomed to a hand-to-mouth struggle for survival side by side with the wage workers. There is a suspicion spreading that millions will never work again but will just eke out their mortal days on the dole. Why? Because industry can produce better and faster than ever before.

### What Is Socialist Education

The popular inkling and dread of this situation has given rise in several countries to violent attempts to cope with it: mass movements of social reform that go by the name of fascism. Fascism is an alarm, not a corrective. Like our New Deal, the economic and political measures applied by the Fascist States cannot stop the movement of capitalism in the direction of its historic barrier. They hurry it forward to the stage and form where the need for doing away with the system of production for profit will become generally clear. A wide realization that there is no hope for a decent living under the wages system (whether in its private capitalist form, or under outright State ownership, or under Fascist government control—that, to repeat, is the ideological basis of what Marx described as the coming maturity of the working class for an independent historic movement. The realization that the present social-economic setup—the system of wage labor—cannot serve human needs adequately and must be done away with, that is socialist understanding. The independent historic movement of the working class will arise when, under the pressure of changing material conditions, after deep social experience, there appear signs of wide, popular socialist understanding. This movement will probably grow rapidly once it has begun. After a point, its growth will likely be faster than the changes in form of struggling capitalism. (It will be a greatly changed capitalism that will be taken over for socialism.)

Is this race between lagging socialist ideology and the material development of capitalism—a mechanical, or automatic, process? Human beings will reach a certain outlook as a result of bitter experience and disillusionment; as a result of frustrated attempts to solve the problem of food, clothing and shelter within the framework of the existing system; as a result of the compulsion of the material facts of over-ripe capitalism, which themselves destroy many popular illusions and prejudices hindering today clear social thinking. Will that be a mechanical, or automatic, process?

What is the role of the socialist propagandist in the development of this process? The spread of the understanding that it is necessary to do away with the wages system will not be the artificial product of the "educative" activity of socialists. It will be the cumulative historic product of the reaction of human beings to a rapidly developing capitalism that defeats all attempts at making it behave in an uncaptalist manner. Marx observed that theory, too, becomes a material force when it has laid hold of great numbers. The increased activity of socialist propagandists will have a deep and accelerating effect on the spread of socialist understanding. But placed as one factor in the general scene, the activity of the socialist propagandists can not be the cause of the changed outlook of the population but rather a sign, a symptom, of the readiness of great numbers, under the pressure of a rapidly changing material

environment, to comprehend the socialist message. When it is easier for socialist propagandists to be heard, there will be more socialist propagandists. More people will be talking socialism.

But: "What heights of education must the proletariat reach?" scoffs the Trotsky leaderite. "What is the degree of understanding that it must have of the socialist outlook? Martov would have agreed that the possibility for examining the masses to test their knowledge of socialism is excluded. He would have agreed even that all the masses can be expected to comprehend, under the adverse conditions of capitalism is that the present system is unbearable and that it is necessary to take over the factories and produce for the welfare of the people."

### "Revolutionary Marxism!"

Eighty-nine years after Marx's patient lectures to Willich and Schapper, who were quite earnest in their illusions, our contemporary Messiahs are back to the reasoning of Willich and Schapper. And in 1939 this dogmatic idealism is being peddled as "revolutionary Marxism."

No, brother, nobody will stop to examine the masses to learn if they know enough to make the socialist revolution. We shall know that the so-called masses know enough to make the socialist revolution when they start making it, when the socialist understanding of the great numbers begins to be translated into popular socialist action, when the great numbers start to organize politically in order to accomplish the change from capitalism to socialism. For what is the socialist understanding we are talking about? Exactly this: the understanding that the present system is unbearable and that it is necessary to take over the factories and produce for the welfare of the people. Some get this understanding before others. As Martov put it, its spread "does not take in homogeneously all the layers of the proletariat, nor all phases of their conscious-

(3) "The minority (Schapper-Willich 'Left' fraction) substitutes dogmatism for the standpoint of criticism, and idealism for materialism. For them the motive power of revolution is simple will, instead of actual conditions. While we say to the workers: 'You have got to go through fifteen, twenty, fifty years of civil wars and wars between nations not merely in order to change your conditions but in order to change yourselves and become qualified for political power,' you tell them on the contrary: 'We must achieve power immediately, otherwise we may as well lie down and go to sleep.' While we specially point out the undeveloped nature of the German proletariat to the German workers, you flatter the national feelings and craft prejudices of the German handicraftsman in the crudest way, which is, no doubt, more popular. Just as the democrats turned the word 'people' into a sacred being, so you have done with the 'proletariat.' Like the Democrats you substitute revolutionary phrases for revolutionary evolution..." These are Marx's words as recorded in the minutes of the London Central Committee of the Communist League, September 15, 1850, and quoted by Marx in the pamphlet *Revelations Concerning the Communist Trial in Cologne*. If he had been able to look farther ahead, he would have probably added another fifty years to his estimate for the rise of a large socialist movement in Germany and elsewhere.

(2) Letter to Bolte, 23rd of November, 1871. Page 315, *Selected Correspondence*, International Publishers.



ness." When it will have "taken in" very many, we shall have social action for the abolition of the existing system. Quantity will make the new quality. The spread of socialist understanding will probably advance in great bounds as the accelerated capitalist development refutes harshly the present and future attempts of the nation. States to cope with it.

What is left of the claim of the "effective role of the vanguard" so brazenly advanced by these un-Marxian sects in the name of historical materialism, in the name of Marxism? "But," argues the Messiah, "it is senseless to think that the workers can achieve victory without a leadership formulating correct tactics and strategy. The masses do not come together on their own initiative and decide when and how to take power?"

### What Is "Leadership?"

No? Even in the case of the non-socialist political action—accomplished, under the guidance of knowing minorities (vanguards), by masses that remain ignorant of the real aim, content and limits of their movement—your "leadership" will only formulate programs of action that hope to strike a response in the great mass. To be effective, not utopian, these programs must suit the prevailing outlook, the outlook that the mass has reached under the pressure of material circumstances.

Great numbers of people act for common, social purposes through political organizations, that is, through representatives. Why cannot the great mass of the people, when it possesses the understanding that "the present system is unbearable and that it is necessary to take over the factories and produce for the welfare of the people," act for that purpose through representation by their ablest and most forward comrades? We can even grant the professional "leader" his insistence on an "unmannerly" revolution, though it is evident that the greater the popular support of the revolutionary act the less likely it is to be marked by violence. And the socialist revolution, because it is the "deepest of historic actions," can only be the self-conscious act of the overwhelming majority.

If by "leadership" he means the mouthpieces of an existing general outlook, or the early voices of the future general socialist outlook, or the chosen representatives of socialist mass organizations,—what "tactics," what "strategy," can the persons writing and speaking in behalf of socialism have to offer other than the formulation of the socialist understanding which the historic development of capitalism has brought to the mass?

But by "leadership" the Trotskyite does not mean merely "mouthpieces" of the historic interests of the working class, or the representative instruments of popular socialist action. Observe his use of the military terms: tactics, strategy. By leadership, he means a "general staff of the revolution."

### Napoleons of the Revolution

For him and other "Marxists" who have learned their "Marxism" in the schools of the Communist International, social revolutions are affairs of "general staffs" in command of obedient masses untroubled by the understanding of what it is all about. So was it for Bakunin who (writes Marx) "entered the International Workingmen's Association, in 1868, with the aim of forming inside it a second International called the 'Alliance of Social-Democracy,' with himself as leader," in other words, to "capture" it.

Referring specifically to the Russian situation Bakunin said: "The people itself should compose the revolutionary army. The revolutionary intellectuals would construct a sort of general staff"—to guide the obedient revolutionary army. For, wrote Tkachev (an immediate heir of Bakunin) in the 70's: "Neither now nor in the future is the people, left to itself, capable of accomplishing the social revolution... The people cannot help itself. The people cannot direct its own fate to suit its true needs. It cannot give body and life to the ideas of the social revolution... This role and mission belong, unquestionably to the revolutionary minority." The very same relation—a revolutionary minority directing masses that are in a condition of discontent but are unaware of the real aim and content of the movement—has been found convenient by all the professional revolutionary groups, including the modern Bolsheviks, Italian Fascists and Nazis.

This is their organizational scheme:

The mass, the army of the revolution, is under the immediate supervision of the revolutionary party. The membership of the latter forms the officer ranks, the commanding cadres of the revolution. The direction of the movement, its tactical moves, strategy and maneuvers are determined and ordered by the "general staff" of the revolution. That is the inner, ruling clique of the revolutionary party. This structural and functional scheme of the Bolshevik, Fascist and Nazi party organizations was faithfully sketched in Bakunin's revolutionary catechism." The likeness was due to the similar nature of the revolutionary action that all these sets of professional revolutionists faced.

What is the chief concern of the strategy and maneuvers dictated by the revolutionary general staff? It is to win the "leadership" of the mass. It is to keep it from falling under the "leadership" of rival general staffs. This worry finds expression in the Trotskyite's fear that—"they who loudly proclaim that the workers require no leadership are in reality against any leadership but their own." For social revolution is to him a question of "right leaders." There are good leaders and bad leaders. The Bakuninist, Bolshevik, Fascist, Nazi or Trotskyite general staff constitute the only "good leaders" and "right leaders." The salvation of the masses, the success of the revolution, depends on whether the masses submit themselves to the "right leaders." The alternative is fas-

cism, etc., or bolshevism, or anarchy, depending on which set of professional leaders is broadcasting its claims. The submission of the masses is accomplished by having the Party flaunt the "right policy," expressed through any slogans that will succeed in striking a response in the discontent of the masses. The slogans may be false, in so far as they do not correspond to the aim that the general staff has privately set for the movement. That does not matter. It does not matter if the mass is fooled. The mass does not need to understand where it is going. The thing is to get its obedience. The "revolutionary" policy is revolutionary and the slogans are good slogans if they turn the trick.<sup>5</sup>

### Demagogic Idealism

Here too these peddlers of demagogic idealism miss reality by a mile. It has already been suggested that no matter what is the historic level of the political action considered—whether it is that of change within the framework of capitalism or that aimed at by the socialist revolution, the ideologists can only manipulate hopes and demands that have seized the minds of the general population as a result of common prevalent experience. People are not fooled into political change. The winning "leaders" are themselves the expression of the prevailing ideas of the mass, with all its prejudices. In the contest for "leadership" which takes place within capitalist society, or in a society undergoing a transformation from an earlier historic level to capitalism, it is the set of "leaders" whose program and promises correspond closest to the prevailing expectations and understanding of the great mass that finally wins the prize of government. The predominant outlook of society, and not the will of any advanced minority, is the decisive factor in any political change, whether it is progressive capitalist or socialist. However, between pro-capitalist and socialist political actions there is, we shall see, a profound difference in the relation existing between the aim of the movement and its popular means.

Thus at one time, in 1917, the Russian Bolsheviks opposed the soviets. They belatedly "all power to the soviets" a little later. They eased their way toward power by adopting as their own the language of the anti-State illusions that possessed the Russian industrial workers in 1918 in reaction to the authoritarianism of the Tsarist régime. But that was merely an avenue to power. They won State power precisely because they offered a program which responded clearly to the great cry of the Russian people for "land, bread and peace." They secured their rule by taking steps to cope immediately with the economic disorganization that prevailed in the country.

(6) Thus the New York Trotskyites, called on good people to smash the Fascists" at a recent Washington's Day celebration by the Nazis, though they knew that the rival revolutionists, the Nazis, invited the publicity afforded them by the advertised threat to interfere with their meeting. Both Nazis and Trotskyites wanted, first of all, publicity. Both sets of professional revolutionists collaborated, so to speak, in their quest of a following.

(4) *State and Socialist Revolution*, International Review, Page 32.

(5) *Letter to Bolto*.



Lenin described the economic program of the victorious Bolsheviks as "immediate revolutionary measures, which were resorted to frequently in a practical way when the bourgeois governments went to war, for those measures were absolutely necessary to prevent total economic bankruptcy and famine." These measures—the nationalization of land (already appropriated privately by the peasants), the government regulation of banks and financial combines, the government regulation of industry through syndicates or employers and employees (in the later fascist style)—did not solve the terrific disorganization of the productive process. They could not be applied, since private industrial enterprise could not function even in proffered co-operation with the State. The Russian State was, therefore, obliged to step in and make an heroic effort to run the industries—in places after suppressing with the bayonet the shop-committee that had seized the factories. Soviet "socialism"—that is, State-monopoly capitalism—is not the "experiment" which idealistic muddleheads describe it to be. It arose not in consequence to a plan thought up by a strong-willed, far-visioned set of idealists, but in response to the imperative needs of the country.

#### Instruments of Capitalist Revolution

Similarly the Italian and German Bolsheviks—the Fascists and the Nazis—won State power by suiting their program to the overwhelming popular understanding of their compatriots as to what the "country needed" in a time of national stress. In 1919 Mussolini and his fasci called for the seizure of factories and an international league of "proletarian" nations. (Italy, Soviet Russia, Red Bulgaria, etc.). In 1921, they pogrommed trade union headquarters, and called for the "freedom" of private enterprise. The Nazi victory of 1933 is the product of the popular German confusion of the ills of the great depression with the "shame" of the Versailles treaty. National Socialism is a precise and meaningful term, if by "socialism" we mean what the Social-Democracy taught us it was—a popular movement for the reform of capitalism within the bounds of capitalism. Under the pressure of material circumstances both the Fascists and the Nazis were obliged to forget the little man whom they were going to save from the threat of "finance capital" and Russian communism. Following the direction of Bolshevism, they are spreading the concentration of the national economy, under a veiled form of "communist" state monopoly.

Once in power, the successful politicians can influence the thought of the population by means of the official instruments of propaganda and constraint at their disposal. But finally the attitude and expectations of the population, on which the politicians' stay in power continues to depend, are decided not by propaganda, not by tricks of ideology, and certainly not by threats of violence, but by the situation, and need of the productive forces. No mat-

ter what the Commissar of Public Enlightenment, or the head of the N.K.V.D., may have to say, no matter how often he may say it,—the developing movement of capitalist production must lead working people, and others who suffer as a result of the contradictions of capitalism, to the understanding that only the abolition of the existing productive relations can solve their problems.

We have been dealing here with the development of the capitalist revolution in Russia, Italy and Germany." The gist of Martov's essays on the State and the socialist revolution is precisely this: the Bolsheviks' accession to power in Russia is, to use Marx's words, "a point in the process of the bourgeois revolution itself and will serve the cause of the latter by aiding its further development." (Page 58, *State and Socialist Revolution*.) The Russian Revolution is for him a revolution for the capitalist emancipation and modernization of a great backward empire, taking place in the 20th century. The late date of its occurrence, and the role of the industrial proletariat as one of the important instruments of this revolution, explain for Martov the "socialist" phraseology with which its ideologists, the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, the Bolsheviks, dressed it up. The peculiar historic conditions under which this revolution of capitalist emancipation took place, explain for Martov why the Bolsheviks, in order to get to power, reached out for the soviets, those makeshift, spontaneous representative bodies, arising in lieu of more definite representative bodies, in a situation of social chaos. The peculiar situation explains for him the Bolsheviks' convenient loan of the notion of the possibility of instituting immediately a non-authoritarian, non-State social order—finally to clamp down on the country a highly repressive, emphatically authoritarian, bureaucratic State apparatus. No, the soviets were not "devised" by the Bolsheviks. They were found convenient and used by them for the occasion. In a number of ways, the Nazis were just as ingenious in their borrowing. "The Soviet regime becomes the means of bringing into power and maintaining in power a revolutionary minority."

#### Bourgeois Jacobinism

Does that mean that Martov says that the Bolsheviks "represent the tradition of Blanquism," as the Trotskyite critic would have it? No, the shrewd Trotskyite has missed it again. (Or he is again inventing.) Martov makes a point of stressing that the ideas and methods do not represent the "tradition of Blanquism," but

(8) The Trotskyite's allegation about "Martov and others who were anxious to postpone the revolution to some future date" is either a willful misstatement or a sign that he thought it was wiser to criticize Martov without reading him too closely. That is more convenient for the critic who writes per order. (We shall see that a similar "tactic" is tried by the Lovestonite Apex in connection with the discussion of the State form.) No, Martov did not want to delay the Russian Revolution. The idea can only occur to the people who think that revolutions are made to order, by "general staffs" and "leaders." But Martov denied that the Russian Revolution could be a socialist revolution.

rather parallel the ideas and methods of bourgeois Jacobinism. Not that the Jacobin methods and aims were consciously imitated by the Russian revolutionists. Their choice was decided by the similar social tasks facing the two historically distinct movements. Bolshevism is, for Martov, Jacobinism in 20th Century Russia. It used, in spite of its socialist phraseology, "methods that have featured the bourgeois revolutions. And these revolutions have always been accomplished by transferring the power of a 'conscious minority, supporting itself on an unconscious majority' to another minority finding itself in an identical situation."

#### Can't Use Mass Understanding

In other words, Martov does not reprove the Bolsheviks for any errors, let alone (quoting again the wily Trotskyite) their supposed "failure to understand the necessity of waiting for the proletariat to be completely educated to the realization that socialism is desirable and necessary." As an historic materialist, Martov understood that the socialist or bourgeois revolutionary understanding of the mass cannot be the artificial product of the efforts of educators or propagandists but develops inevitably and dialectically out of its position in capitalism. In that fine chapter on "Metaphysical Materialism and Dialectical Materialism," he shows why "the educator has himself to be educated." For him, what the critic refers to as the "errors of Bolshevism" are merits which helped to perfect Bolshevism as an instrument of the capitalist emancipation of the backward Russian empire. In the making of a progressive national (bourgeois) revolution, there is no waiting "for the proletariat to be completely educated to the realization that socialism is desirable and necessary." This is just as true about the revolutions now taking place in China, India, Turkey and Mexico, as it is true about the still incomplete Russian Revolution. ("Of what use to us," exclaims Stalin in 1939, "is a party of intellectuals?") The job of the Jacobinical intellectuals who "lead" those revolutions, is to mobilize (not to educate) the proletariat where and if, as in the 20th century Russia, the industrial proletariat of the country is important enough to serve as shock troops in the action directed by the "revolutionary vanguard." Mobilization—that is not quite the same thing as socialist understanding and education.

Martov's writings on the Russian Revolution are especially useful to us because they make clear what a socialist revolution is not. Martov wrote on the Russian Revolution during the years 1918 to 1923. His analysis and observations show that the Stalinist regime of today is not a perversion but a perfection of something that is inherent in Bolshevism, just as it is in Italian Fascism and German Nazism. Martov was not a prophet. He was an observer and analyst. "Revolution betrayed!" is the pathetic cry of a politician who having fallen from power, is profoundly envious of the Bolshevik Caesar smoking his pipe

(7) *Aims of the Proletariat in Our Revolution.*

(8) *State and Socialist Revolution*, page 58.



with great ease on the top of the great industrial-military pile that rises on the backs of the Russian people. For the fallen Commissar still loves what, in his dogmatic-idealist way of seeing things, he considers to be his handiwork.

Martov's writings are especially useful to us because they help to uncover the "socialist" masquerade of the agents of a national bourgeois revolution, and their attempts to foist the swindle on the workers of the world, to the hurt of the cause of socialism.

After the "First International"—which was founded by Marx and his associates in an attempt to "replace the Socialist or semi-Socialist sects by a real organization of the working class for struggle"—the labor movement has, in turn, seen the prominence of the following three ideological systems, each of which offered something that responded to the illusions common at the time:

#### Anarchism and Social Democracy

1. Anarchism in the 80's and 90's. The proletarian revolution was going to begin by doing away with the State. In fact, its most important early figure, Michael Bakunin—though he argued for "autonomism" and "anti-authoritarianism"—had in mind a political scheme that may be described as a loose, autonomist federation of local, typically Bolshevik, "dictatorships of the proletariat," ruled quite authoritatively by the "advanced revolutionary elements" within each, for the supposed benefit of the mass. These semi-independent "negations of the State" were going to be achieved through armed insurrections of the masses led by the professional revolutionists.

Later came "syndicalism," a fusion of the ideas of anarchism with the practice of trade-unionism. Capitalism was going to be done away with by means of "direct action" and general strikes. Anarchism at its best, was the idealistic reaction of intellectuals whose love of liberty and fair-play was sorely bruised in the forward rush of capitalist industry toward the end of the 19th century. It offered an ideological escape to good people who just could not find themselves in the hurly-burly. Anarcho-syndicalism, objectively considered, was the militant reaction of the workers to the obstinate opposition of the employers to the workers' demand for collective bargaining. Its revolutionary rationalization was supplied by the anarchist intellectuals who rushed to "lead" the workers in the tussle with the bosses. The improvement and extension of the use of machinery in the industrial process, which took quite a leap at the beginning of the 19th century, resulted in the vastly increased productivity of labor. This made trade-unionism economically acceptable to employers, and killed "revolutionary syndicalism." Quite a number of very revolutionary anarchist leaders of the workers became respectable, and even conservative trade union officials.

2. The Social Democracy, which waxed big during the beautiful fourteen years before the World War. Social reforms arose to suit the social and political ad-

justments made necessary by changes in the economic process of capitalism after the great colonial conquests at the end of the 19th century. In the good spirit of wish-thinking, these reforms were confidently recognized by the "socialists" of the time as luscious links in a long sausage string, at the end of which dangled the reform of reforms: socialism. The latter was popularly described as many capitalist reforms piled on the top of each other. The Social Democratic parties, active in the political field as the advance agents and publicity men of these necessary and laudable adjustments of capitalism, thought of themselves as inspiring and creating these adjustments and therefore gently pushing capitalism to "grow into" socialism.

3. Russian (Bolshevik) Communism, combining the Anarchist and Social Democratic illusions in an ideological system by which the labor movement of the world was going to be recruited to stand guard, as a sort of Foreign Legion, over the national progressive (capitalist) Russian Revolution—in the name of the international socialist proletarian revolution. The Communist International was established. With the improved control of the new masters of Russia over this foreign agency of theirs, there were transfused into the minds of their Western adherents all the demagogic tricks and popular illusions that helped the Bolsheviks to win power. In the minds of the foreign recruits of the C.I., the methods and program of Bolshevism (the historic instrument of the capitalist emancipation and modernization of the Russian empire) came to be confused with the struggle for socialism. We thus find added to the typical bourgeois, laborite and anarchist conception of leadership, the myth of the wonder-working "soviet," now wielded with an authoritarian purpose, and no longer the autonomist institution that it was (under the name of "revolutionary commune") in the anarchist ideology, from which the faith in this makeshift representative body was borrowed.

#### Ideology of Bolshevism

Underlying these articles of ideology, and forming together with them the heart of what by 1924 came to be described as Leninism, is the proposition that while the working class, may by itself attain a trade union and "reformist" consciousness, it is incapable of independent (class) political thinking. "It receives its social outlook, in the shape of ready made ideology, either from the bourgeoisie or from the revolutionary intelligentsia." The working class, or the oppressed numbers of capitalist society, cannot become conscious of the need of socialism, merely as a result of their position in the productive process of capitalism. This consciousness can only be brought to them from outside the class by the revolutionary intelligentsia.

The formulation of this idea was borrowed by the Bolsheviks from the older Russian revolutionists. They were pleased to have the same idea expressed by their Western master, Karl Kautsky, whose theoretic formulations, "radical" or cautious,

suited the confused needs of the clerical staffs guiding the Western Social Democracy—a movement which on its red banner days hailed the distant goal of socialism, but in historic reality was only a popular instrument serving the adjustments made necessary by changes in the economic process of capitalism. This conception is also beloved by the revolutionary intellectuals speaking for the "national liberation" of awakening colonial regions. It is typical of the "socialist" theory of Western Laborism, of the ideologists of "national liberation," and of Russian Bolshevism because it suits the needs of social change toward and within capitalism. How does it apply to the movement for socialism?

Commenting on this theory of Lenin's, Sprenger<sup>10</sup> points out that the great Russian revolutionist reached it by transferring to his "socialist activity" something that is a special feature of class society: the separation between mental and manual labor. To repeat, Lenin forgot that also in the labor movement an intellectual can only formulate—formulate and not create—the ideas that begin to enter the minds of people as a result of social experience. "He considered himself to be the creator of an ideology. He was in fact only the 'mouthpiece' of certain social forces. He called himself a 'Marxist,' but he never held anything more than an idealistic view of the political tendencies of his time, which were themselves created in the material process of social development."

"In Lenin's conception of 'political consciousness' there is no question of proletarian socialism. The sort of 'consciousness' Lenin had in mind was something by the means of which the working class could be mobilized and assigned a task in a bourgeois revolution. Considered from this angle, his stand that the 'political consciousness' of the working class could only be developed outside of the working class had real meaning. His thesis actually amounts to the following: The political thought that was to mobilize the workers for the complicated revolution against Tsarism could only be the creation of the Jacobinical intelligentsia. And this was true to the extent that the expected revolution presented tasks—like the peasant question—which could not be mastered on the basis of the struggle of the proletariat in its historic role as a force for socialism. The chief problem in this revolution was not the shattering of the productive relations of capitalism but the destruction of the surviving feudal relations. Quite naturally the Russian working class could not develop 'spontaneously' (that is, out of its position within the process of capitalist production) an insight into the needs of an anti-feudal revolution. This is the essential meaning of Lenin's thesis on the 'political class-consciousness' of the proletariat. We see that it does not refer to the consciousness of a working class participating in a bourgeois revolution, for which it has to be mobilized as an important auxiliary

(10) We hope to publish his essays on the Nature of Bolshevism in pamphlet form as soon as the financial help by our readers makes this possible.



force, Lenin's 'Marxist' terminology is merely a disguise veiling a position typical of the Jacobinical intelligentsia."<sup>11</sup>

### Transformations of the C. I.

This conception also suited the tasks faced by the Communist International. The political consciousness which this great organization of "revolutionary leadership" was going to bring to the workers of the world amounted to this. Under the radicalizing influence of worsened conditions, and manipulated by means of slogans and the right "policies" dangled in front of them by the "revolutionary leaders," the masses were going to be "stampeded" into following the directives put on the order of the day by the "general staff" of the C.I. These directives were put under the general heading of "proletarian revolution." In fact, they had the mentioned great purpose: the defense of the Soviet Union. To suit the diplomatic needs of the masters of Soviet Russia in the sphere of world politics, the C.I. has changed its policies, tactics and slogans a good number of times in the twenty years of its existence. It was a question of immediate armed insurrections in Western Europe, and uprisings for "national liberation" in the colonial countries, at the time when the Western powers, with an eye on the natural resources of Russia, spoke of themselves as crusaders against the menace of Bolshevism and threatened the Soviet republic with intervention and counter-revolution. It was the fate of the apocalyptic Third Period for the capitalist world, when the monster of the Five Year Plans began to drip misery on the Russian people. It is "save democracy" and "build a front of democratic powers against the menace of fascism" now that Hitler and Japan eye greedily the rich Russian empire. The understanding of the necessity of doing all these things is also too complicated a matter for the workers to arrive at without prodig from their betters.

When the Communist parties and their "red" trade-union centrals, composing the C.I., went to the Western workers with "revolutionary" slogans and policies, and called for armed insurrection and immediate general strikes, they remained noisy and ineffectual oppositions to the traditional social-democratic organizations. But once the C.I. embarked on its present "democratic" and popular-front policy, its component organizations in the West are enabled—especially as a result of their strong finances, typical Bolshevik unscrupulousness as to means used, and the advantage of the internationally coordinated and pushed attack—to displace, or "capture" the old radical and laborite mass organizations in some developed countries and the nationalist-revolutionary movements in certain colonial or semi-colonial regions. Thus pro-Russian "Communism" in its pseudo-democratic guise became an important factor in the politics of France, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Mexico, China, and

even Great Britain and the United States.

In all these countries, the Communist parties, and the trade-unions and mass organizations under their control, fulfill the "reformist" functions of the Social Democracy, but always with the paramount aim of serving the Welt-politik needs of the Soviet State. It is only superficially considered that the "line" of the C.I. appears to have changed. The workers are subjected to new tricks of ideology, but, as before, with the purpose of mustering them in the service of the national Russian Revolution. Comrade Dimitroff, the present figure-head president of the C.I., put it plainly, with the aid of a mixed figure of speech: "The keystone for checking the honesty and sincerity of every person active in the labor movement, of every workers' party and organization of the working class, of every democrat in the capitalist countries, is their attitude to the great land of socialism."

### Why the "Oppositions?"

Now where do our friends the Lovestonites and Trotskyites, figure within this scheme of things?

They arose organizationally and theoretically as echoes of the internal struggle for the domination of the Soviet State which raged among the Bolshevik big-shots after Lenin's death. They are treated as renegades and counter-revolutionaries by the official Communists, whom they rival weakly for "leadership" that is, pie-cards and collections—in certain labor organizations. Both "vanguards" cross their hearts and swear by the best phrases in the collected works of Lenin that they are the best friends of the Soviet Union and the only genuine exponents of "Leninism-Marxism" or "Bolshevism-Leninism." For its "genuine and original" Leninism, or "revolutionary Marxism," each reaches out to its favorite ideological phase in the history of the C.I.—that is, the one just before their leaders fell from the Soviet Olympus. Thus up to recently, the Trotskyites exhaled heroically the spirit of the first four congresses of the Communist International, while the Lovestonites assured all who would listen that it is the slogans and policies of 1924-1928 that represented the true word of God.

In their contradictory position as self-avowed but spurned "loyal opposition" to the present rulers of the U.S.S.R., both little sets of big talkers are obliged to play at being more "revolutionary" and more "Leninist" than the official Communism. Till the day before yesterday, they presented, in contrast to the "popular front" policy of the C.I., a war policy that apparently called for the defense of the Soviet Union and at the same time proposed the exercise of "revolutionary defeatism" everywhere else, even in the countries that may be war allies of the Soviet Union. Considered closely, we find here too a game of words.

Take, for example, the war policy of the Trotskyites. For several years after his exile, the Old Man of that "movement" played with his "Clemenceau thesis." In 1915, in the face of the German danger,

the French bourgeoisie found it advisable to submit itself to the personal dictatorship of the rather unlikable Georges Clemenceau. So, dreamt Leon Trotsky, the inefficient present masters of Soviet Russia would surely be obliged to call on him, the great Commissar of War, to lead their armies and organize victory, in the case of an anti-Soviet revolt or a foreign war. The Bolshevik Napoleon was going to return from his Elba.

Today, however, the old man curbs his fancy. After fulminating hotly against the bad "social patriots" who, as usual, are ready to betray the working class by supporting a war to "save democracy," he counsels his followers that, in France and the United States, and other countries allied to the Soviet Union, the "revolutionists" must not seek "revolutionary victory, as in the reactionary imperialist camps, at the price of military defeat, but by the way of the military victory of their country!"<sup>12</sup>

### Trotskyism: Bolshevism Reduced to Absurdity

It is the obvious non-sense of the stand of these communist oppositions that enables the C.I. publicity men to build up a bugaboo of Trotskyism, with which to confuse any attempts at independent action in the labor movement of today. Trotskyism, seemingly the personal expression of Leon Trotsky, is Russian Bolshevism reduced to an absurdity. But also Trotskyism, in its ambition to be taken seriously, must attempt to suit itself to the world that is exterior to its particular make-believe. The "general staff" must find an army to command.

Therefore, in accordance with the directions from the all-highest, the Trotskyite organization in the United States has gone through a number of tactical transformations: changes of name, fusions, amalgamations, etc. And it is still on the march. After presenting themselves as a "Communist League" and as a "Workers' Party," Trotsky's literary agents and their followers begged their way into the Socialist Party of America, swearing solemnly they were entering not to "capture" the organization—in accordance with the tactic of the Leninist United Front—but to build it. But soon the Moscow trials came, and brought a heavy "press" for the Old Man. The time seemed to be right for the big job. Clamoring in revolutionary indignation that the bad old membership of the S.P.A. was planning to enter the American Labor Party, the "revolutionists" got themselves expelled from the Socialist Party of America. They hoped to swing (the "revolutionary vanguard" term is "stamped") quite a following. Somehow or other, the "tactic" did not take. The intellectuals who came forward to defend Trotsky against Vishinsky's charges took the occasion not only to condemn Stalin but Bolshevism in general, without sparing its *reductio ad absurdum*: Trotskyism. With every request from above (to change names and put on a new set of false whiskers and smoked glasses), there were defections

(11) Compare Max Nomad's pleasantly romantic interpretation of historic change as the dynastic struggle of a "revolutionary elites," which should make a great movie, on the style of Cecil De Mille's old historic pageants.

(12) *Quatrième Internationale*, June 1933. Page 104.



of simple-minded Bolshevik-Leninists who failed to understand that theirs was not to reason why, or who just could not keep up with the forced and intricate ideological march of this vanguard of the vanguards. As a result, the Trotskyites' road to supreme revolutionary leadership is strewn with many split-offs, who see the negation of pure Leninism not only in Stalin but in Trotsky himself.

But hew to the line, and let the splinters fall where they may! Today the former Trotskyite "Communist League of America," which had fused with a set of amateur labor-college slummers to form the "Workers' Party," which then dissolved to have its membership join up as a loyal part of the Socialist Party of America and then left in righteous indignation at the very task of a Labor Party, and, as long as the law permitted, attempted to pose as the S.P.A., or its Left Wing—the Trotskyites are now trying to have their tactic-weary dozens steal individually into the awful American Labor Party, in search of an army to command.

### Professional Mystifiers

The recent attempt of the Trotskyite "theoretic organ of revolutionary Marxism" to scare into silence its many split-offs by publishing names and other personal details in the lives of those rival Bolshevik-Leninists, and the tearful reproach addressed by the same theoretic organ to the "unattached intellectuals," who continue to see little difference between Trotskyism and Stalinism, both go to show that Trotsky's struggling literary agents are very much alarmed they are doomed to remain just Trotsky's literary agents.

Obviously the dialectical materialist view that Martov presents in opposition to the dogmatic idealism resorted to by the opportunist politician cannot solve the problems faced by a "revolutionary vanguard" like the Trotskyites or, as we shall see, the Lovestonites and other self-appointed "leaders" of the working class. You can't do much nature-faking on the basis of historical materialism. Bolshevism-Leninism is the palladium that these "revolutionary" business concerns must defend with all the cunning at their disposal. For what are they without this front of theoretic fraud? Just two more little sets of pie-card artists, rivaling other "revolutionists" like themselves for union jobs and a penny or two in donations.

These "revolutionists" present themselves as "carriers of socialist consciousness to the masses," as professional "leaders" of these masses toward socialism. Thus the Trotskyite critic protests in a tortured tone: "The intellectuals who are in the mortal fear of a disciplined party will do us a great favor if they will figure out how the proletariat can emancipate itself without any leadership." (For the busted, declassed intellectuals afflicted with a messianic yearning, "intellectual" has become a term with which to annihilate uncomfortable opposition.)

We have tried to explain that all is not yet lost when the workers of the United States follow Roosevelt instead of Brow-

der, Lovestone, or Trotsky's proxy in New York, No, all is not lost. To the self-styled "only" vanguard of the vanguards, the following will constitute an unsatisfactory answer:

The political organization that will be the instrument of socialist emancipation finds its form late in the experience of the working class. It will be crystallized in the process of the class struggle. It will arise as the expression of the rise and increase of socialist understanding among the workers and the rest of the oppressed population of capitalist society. This socialist understanding will be predominantly the product of capitalist development, coupled with the lesson of experience derived from wide disillusionment at the various attempts to make capitalism behave any other way than it can.

### What We Can Do

The honest "ideologist" can do his bit to help the development of the "real" workers' movement that Marx talked of in his letter to Bolte. He can help by looking facts straight in the face, by studying and indicating the direction and movement of capitalism, by carefully desisting from telling himself and others even "inspirational" lies about the workers' state of mind, about the revolutionary prospects of the social situation. He can help by refuting the multitarious tricks of the current sects and sectarians, no matter how revolutionary may be their protestations. He can help by always being a socialist propagandist—in face of all enthusiasms, whether it is to elect a good man to the presidency, to save democracy by war, to rescue the cause of socialism by joining in the international politics of the U.S.S.R., or even to patch up the punctured fortunes and deflated dreams of a great literary figure and war commissar.

With an eye on the development of the real workers' movement, the honest ideologists will not presume to set themselves up as "leaders," or "vanguards," or as Leon Trotsky himself phrases it (and he is not joking), a "vanguard of the vanguard." Vanguards and leaders do not belong in the workers' movement that will arise with the spread of socialist understanding. It does not belong there, except as an interfering influence. Because the job of this real workers' movement will be not to accomplish a bourgeois revolution, or to serve as an instrument in bringing about "progressive" changes in capitalism, but to abolish capitalism, to make a socialist revolution. Here is how the matter was put more than thirty-five years ago by a person who insisted on peering through the ideological maze of the time.

### "Leaders" in the Socialist Movement

"In all the class struggles of the past, waged in the interest of minorities and in which, as Marx said, 'development was brought about in opposition to the great mass of the people,' an essential condition of action was the ignorance of the mass concerning the real aim, the material con-

tent and the limits of the movement. This difference between the 'leaders' and the 'led' was the specific historical basis underlying the 'directing role' assumed by the 'educated bourgeoisie.' A natural complement to the role played by the bourgeois 'leaders' was the part of 'followers' left to the mass.

"But already in 1845 Marx noted that 'with the increasing depth of historic action grows the volume of the mass engaged in this action.' The class struggle waged by the proletariat is the 'deepest' of all historic actions that have taken place up to now. It takes in all the lower sections of the people. For the first time since the beginning of class society, it corresponds to the interests of the people itself.

"That is why the understanding by the mass of its tasks and instruments is an indispensable condition for socialist revolutionary action—just as formerly the ignorance of the mass was an indispensable condition for the revolutionary action of the ruling classes.

"As a result, the difference between 'leaders' and the 'majority trotting along behind' is abolished (in the socialist movement). The relation between the mass and the leaders is destroyed. The only function left to the supposed 'guides' of the social-democracy is that of explaining to the mass the historic mission of the latter. The authority and influence of such 'leaders' grow in proportion to the work of education of this kind accomplished by them. Their prestige and influence increase only in the measure that they, the so-called leaders, destroy the condition that was formerly the basis for every function of leaders: the blindness of the mass. Their influence grows in the measure that they strip themselves of their role as leaders, in the measure that they make the mass self-directing and they themselves become no more than the executive organs of the self-conscious action of the mass.

"Undoubtedly, the transformation of the mass into a sure, conscious, lucid 'self-leader'—the fusion of science and the working class dreamt of by Lassalle—can only be a dialectic process, as the working class movement absorbs uninterruptedly new proletarian elements as well as fugitives from other sections of society.

"Nevertheless such is and such will be the dominant tendency of the socialist movement: the abolition of the relation of 'leaders' and 'led' in the bourgeois sense of the word, the abolition of the relation that is the historic basis of all class domination."

They who presume to set themselves up as "leaders" and "vanguards" do not understand capitalism and therefore cannot conceive of the nature of its negation: the socialist revolution. Especially do they not see that they themselves, strutting in their role as self-styled "leaders," are rather the auxiliary forces of changing capitalism than parts of the movement for socialism.

Let us next consider the revolutionary political institutions offered by these vanguards of the vanguards as the only correct ones. What of the "soviets"?



# books

GERMANY: *The Last Four Years.* The Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, 116 pages, \$1.75.

THIS little book (most of which originally appeared in the London Banker, before the Anschluss and Munich) should be put in the hands of all private possessors of big money who toy wishfully with the idea of Fascism. It appears to be a risky business, gentlemen. A scary picture is presented by this plain-speaking examination of the economic and political results of four years of Nazi rule:

1. The price of the enormous scale of her (Nazi Germany's) rearmament—no less than the replacement of private initiative with State control—is: the rapid depletion of resources inherited from the past, steady decline in the standard of living of the population, a growing economic isolation from the rest of the world.

2. The businessman has lost his liberty. He suffers from the disadvantages of State interference (bureaucratic formalities, cost of State control of economy) without getting its advantages. "He carries the risk which private enterprise necessarily has to take, while he is not free to employ his private capital where reasonable profits seem to him assured." There is a tendency to replace the independent farmer by the "grain factory" on the Russian model.

3. Heavy taxation weighs down the private entrepreneur with expenditures, unequalled in any other country. "The German totalitarian State is not more efficient than a democratic one. It represents, indeed, a dualism in public administration which is both inefficient and costly."

5. There is a tendency to shift most of the necessary decrease in the standard of nutrition to the wealthier class. "And it can be safely assumed it will be continued, if necessary, until the standard of nutrition of the wealthier has sunk to that of the poorer classes." (Of course, the "poorer classes" must be kept just fit enough to be serviceable as workers and cannon fodder.)

6. The main achievement of Nazi rule is that it has created a considerable international "nuisance value." By means of its military strength, the Nazi State is enabled to "blackmail" the "have" powers. The authors (Germanicus is a composite personality) think that the Army, the "real trustee of the German nation," does not mind being used for blackmail, but will not permit an actual test of strength with a combination of powers.

(The fact is that the army has changed a great deal since Germanicus formulated his observations. Since then "the fight between the Party and the Army has been won by the Party." If there is no war, it is because the Nazi Party wants no war now.)

7. Germanicus deplores the attitude of a small circle in the City of London who want to yield to Hitler's demand for a loan. Germanicus points out that there is practically no "fundamental difference between the principles of Communism and Nazism." The strain caused by the Nazi policies should in time prove unbearable to the German people. "Herr Hitler's nuisance value must be discounted in his own disillusioned country, not in the City of London."

The gang of "professional revolutionists" who had ridden into power in Germany on the back of popular discontent must continue their game of "arm, build, scare and badger," or they will burst. They must get money to go on. They want a loan from England. That is their international politics. Internally, their politics is to get as much as they can for themselves. This "policy" is best suited by State control and ownership.

Like the Bolsheviks before them, the Nazis are obliged by the bad economic situation of the country—to suit their armament program and their personal demands as a "mass" ruler—to institute State control, if not State ownership. As in Russia under Military Communism, there is an approach toward "economic equality" of all classes (excepting the ruling politicians) as the economic scarcity increases.

Germanicus would have rounded out his book by describing the situation of the German workers, who in a large number of the factories stand, as in Russia, under what is practically martial law, and are not able to choose or leave a job without the permission of the State authorities. The book is especially for the banker. But as such it is important for all of us.

ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM, by Oskar Lange and Fred M. Taylor. The University of Minnesota Press, 143 pp. \$1.75.

This interesting book has been published in answer to the contention of Professor Mises (whose work was recently translated into English) that economic accounting—the relation of supply and demand, the allocation of economic resources—is impossible in a socialist society. In capitalism goods are distributed and the supply of products guided through the market. Goods find their money price through competition, commodities for which there is a demand being absorbed and the unwanted commodities refused. How can it be done under socialism?

The solution to the problem offered by Lange and Taylor amounts to the following: Government ownership of the means of production, the relative equalization of wages, the continuation of the price system, prices of goods being based, more or less, on accounting costs of production but raised or lowered as the demand exceeds or falls

short of the supply offered to the consumers.

The Lange and Taylor plan looks as if it would work. It has already been suggested by Kautsky in his *Labor Revolution*. However, after proving that the problem of allocation of resources in production and the relation of demand and supply can be solved through a "non-competitive price system," Lange goes on to prove that already today the non-competitive price system would be largely superfluous, in other words, that the problem can be solved without his "non-competitive" prices. "If the price is already so low, and incomes so high that the quantity consumed of those commodities is equal to the saturation amount, free sharing can be used as a method of distribution. Certain services are distributed in this way already in our present society." (Page 140.) And here, and not before, is where socialism begins.

The fact that the professional economists are considering seriously the problem of social economy is a sign of the times. However, as is suggested on the last few pages by Lange, the professional economists may be somewhat behind the economic development of the times. Socialism will not come as an experiment tried in a laboratory. There are no experiments in the history of society. Socialism will come as a result of the popular realization of the obvious failure of capitalism to meet the needs of society in spite of the high productivity of industry. Socialism can only be based on highly productive capitalism. It is exactly when general high productivity makes possible free goods, free sharing, that socialism begins. And then the problem propounded by Professors Mises, Hayek and Robbins becomes no problem.

The labor theory of value applies to capitalism and not to socialism.

Too many "Marxists" describe the possible establishment of socialism, say in 1939, as if it were taking place in 1875. The "transition" period today would consist of an accounting of the productive forces, the coordination of the various branches of industry, with an eye on raising production so as to introduce as soon as possible the general consumption of goods by "free sharing." Of course, socialism is not being established in 1939. Quite a number of the problems propounded by Lange and the others will be solved by changing capitalism—some time before the population comes to understand that socialism is the easier way.

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**THE ATTACK ON LEVIATHAN**, By Donald Davidson. *The University of North Carolina Press*, 1938. 368 pp. \$5.

MR. DAVIDSON is stirred by the injustice perpetrated by the plutocratic cosmopolitan East on the agrarian South and West. It appears that the Civil war was a war of conquest fought by the predatory imperialism having its center in the banks of New York. It ended, according to Mr. Davidson, in the subjection of the true American region below the Mason and Dixon line, which now has the status of a colonial country, suffering under the yoke of an imperialist power. This oppression is economic and cultural. Economically, says Mr. Davidson, we have here the subjection of an agrarian social structure to the might of financial capital. Culturally, it is the rape of Southern regional folkways by the cosmopolitanism of the "un-American" American large city. A small number of sordid souls, devoid of any regional loyalties, moved only by their love of profits and high salaries, are the beneficiaries of this domination of the Leviathan.

What is to be done? Mr. Davidson suggests in so many words that it would be nice to have the development of an "American" movement composed of stalwart good men with the feel of regional necessities and loyalties. Since the domination of the Leviathan is national, such a movement must be national. It is to be a movement against the "subtlest and most dangerous foe of humanity—the tyranny that wears the mask of humanitarianism and benevolence," etc., etc.

It is true that capitalism is an expanding economic mode. Capitalism lives and has grown on the ruin, of non-capitalist economic formations. Where natural economy—production for use—was the rule, capitalism introduces the market. With the spread of the influence of the market capitalist production replaces the simple merchant economy common in the invested backward region. After having forced the British peasant and artisan to run to America, capital pushed them from the East to the West, where they were changed into small producers of commodities. "Then capital ruined the American backwoods farmer, and drove him from the West to the North, where the railroads had gone before—and ruin followed. Historically the American farmer has had capital as a guide beckoning in front, and capital as a torturer pushing from the back." (Luxemburg: *Accumulation of Capital*.) In the South, due to certain historic conditions, there arose toward the end of the eighteenth century a bastard economic form, mixing slave labor with large scale agrarian enterprise and producing for the world market. This regional economic system, already undermined by the development of capitalist industry in the North of the United States, was shattered politically by the Civil War. Mr. Davidson shakes his head disconsolately over the past glory of the planters' South. Even now, the poor white trash who starved meekly in the shadow of the great

plantations are being drawn as wage laborers into the industry that is just starting to bloom forth in the old Confederate States.

What have we in this recent product of Chapel Hill? The *Attack* is obviously the work of a "university man," a college instructor. It is the work of a cultured Southerner (professional Southerners survive in the faculties of Southern colleges), who dislikes the present state of affairs and has his romantic illusions about the glory of the old South. It is furthermore the work of a man who, while he permits himself the quaint sweet of fairy tales spun about noble American regionalism, based on slave masters and starving, idle, white plebeians, is somewhat aware of the troubles of capitalism in our time.

Mr. Davidson's ado about disappearing American folkways is nice. His suggestions for "regeneration" are fraught with the shrewd ugliness of cultural fascism.

The ideology of German National Socialism was developed in part on the basis of the pseudo-anthropology devised by romanticist lovers of supposed folkways of pre-capitalist Germany. The Leviathan now holding Germany in its maw brooks no regionalism, especially political. It insists brutally on extreme uniformity of thought and custom. It has chained the entire population of the country to the wheels of a rapacious State-capitalist enterprise. Talk of your Servile State!

College fascism is a mischievous and not too intelligent pastime.

**SPAIN: REVOLUTION & COUNTER-REVOLUTION**, By William Krehm, *League for Revolutionary Workers' Party*.

**REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN SPAIN**, by Felix Morrow. *Pioneer Publishers, N. Y.*

HERE are two "documents" issued by two rival Left Communist groupings, both inviting us to join in the formation of a Fourth International on the basis of the Spanish experience. The one by revolutionist Krehm was apparently written at closer range to the subject and is a bit more sympathetic to the P.O.U.M. The Morrow opus is obviously a rehash of Leon Trotsky's one year old pronouncements on Spain. The "facts" that garnish this "revolutionary Marxian analysis" are withered third-hand facts.

The line of both "revolutionary Marxists" runs like this:

The Spanish masses started to make their revolution and were going to achieve in Spain what had been achieved in Russia

as a result of October, 1918. But, alas, the right leadership was missing. Not finding the right leaders, the masses were taken in hand by the bad leaders, the misleaders. Only the clear-sighted, uncompromising leadership of the correct revolutionary vanguard could bring victory. And, as was already said, the leadership was not there. Therefore the revolution became counter-revolution.

Once the simplicist appraisal of the Spanish situation presented by both intransigent revolutionists is forgiven, the question that comes to one's mind is this: "Why did not the 'revolutionary masses' follow the 'good leaders?'"

"Well," say the "Marxists," "the revolutionary Marxist vanguard was not strong enough to be able to build a strong Bolshevik Party in Spain, which would have supplied correct and uncompromising revolutionary leadership and achieved in Spain the victory gained in Russia in 1918."

"But why was not the revolutionary vanguard strong enough to do all those things?"

"The revolutionary vanguard was not strong enough because the masses followed the misleaders."

"But why did the revolutionary masses, hot in their revolutionary upsurge, follow the misleaders?"

Alas, we are back where we started from.

This idealistic nonsense, presenting social change as a game of leaders and slogans, is sold to all comers as "revolutionary Marxism." Back in 1851, Engels commented on this kind of "Marxism" in the following words:

"When you seek the causes of the success of the counter-revolution, you are offered from all sides this convenient answer: 'Mr. So-and-So or Citizen So-and-So has betrayed the people.' This answer may be true or false, depending on the circumstances. But in any case, it cannot explain nor show how it happened that the 'people' let themselves be thus betrayed. How poor is the situation of a political party that has as its only baggage the knowledge of this single fact: 'Citizen So-and-So does not merit our confidence.' (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany.)

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